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Key Messages 
 
o
 Communications consumers in the UK do not switch provider 
enough, and when they do they sometimes do so irrationally. As 
the government conducts a welcome review of the landscape of 
consumer representation in the UK, they should be aware that 
there is an ongoing, permanent need for consumer 
representation that is specific to the communications sector. 
 
o
 The government’s proposals, by shifting consumer advocacy to 
the Citizen’s Advice Bureau, are likely to result in an increase in 
costs to the public purse. Within the current model Ofcom and its 
consumer panel receive almost half their funding from the 
private sector. If the body is moved to Citizens Advice, the 
proportion met by public funding will be higher.  
 
o
 The fast changing, technical complexity of the communications 
sector makes a consumer representative particularly important. 
Consumer advocacy in communications will be most efficient if it 
is within Ofcom, but has much more effective operational 
independence from it.  
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Introduction 
 
Consumers in the UK have reaped huge benefit from the liberalisation of the 
telecommunications and media sectors over the past three decades. 
Consumers as well as companies have been the engine of this dramatic 
transformation: only if consumers are willing and able to adopt new services 
and take risks will innovation continue, and it is consumers’ spending that 
drives investment. Ultimately, the success of a liberalised communications 
sector rests on a multitude of separate consumer decisions: decisions to 
consume a particular service, to contract or to switch. Active, informed, 
empowered consumers are a key economic asset and should not be taken for 
granted. 
 
In these processes of market driven innovation, we are all consumers, and 
consumer satisfaction is the basic objective for good policy. But consumers 
are also a means to an end, for if a significant proportion of consumers are 
not willing or able to switch, to choose and thus to assert their power, then all 
consumers will suffer, from lower quality, higher prices, and less responsive 
service. Whilst regulators focus on the structural, legal and economic reasons 
why markets may not function effectively, they sometimes neglect the human 
perspective, and fail to examine the reasons why consumers may be unwilling 
or unable to play their part. This is why they need access to an active, 
informed consumer representative 
 
This paper argues that the need for consumer 
representation is particularly acute in fast 
changing sectors such as communications. Where 
new innovations reach the market on a daily 
basis, and the popularity and utility of products 
and services is difficult to predict; regulators and 
public authorities should retreat, focus on areas of 
market failure, and as far as is possible rely on the 
market. But they should also monitor and ensure 
that consumers are able to fulfil the role assigned 
to them in dynamic markets, and make targeted 
policy adjustments to enable consumers to play 
an optimal role.  
 
To a certain extent, the current framework for communications regulation 
reflects these ideals. Since 2003, Ofcom has successfully ‘mainstreamed’ 
consumer empowerment, for example through careful monitoring of consumer 
switching and consumer empowerment in its annual Consumer Experience 
Reports, and the setting up of an independent consumer advocate, the 
 
Ultimately, the 
success of a 
liberalised 
communications 
sector rests on a 
multitude of separate 
consumer decisions: 
decisions to consume 
a particular service, to 
contract or to switch. 
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Communications Consumer Panel.1 This paper draws upon the experience of 
the Communications Consumer Panel in order to assess some of the 
continuing challenges for communications consumers in the UK.  
 
During 2010 and 2011, Ofcom’s role and scope was reduced in the context of 
wide ranging cost savings, and the question of the role of the Consumer 
Panel was again put on the agenda for policy discussion.2 This paper is an 
attempt to assess the changing role of consumer representation in this 
context. 
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1. The Communications Consumer Panel in UK Regulation 
 
The 2003 Communications Act (Section 16) gave a duty to the UK 
communications regulator Ofcom to establish appropriate consumer 
consultation arrangements, and in particular to establish the Ofcom 
Consumer Panel as a semi-independent consumer representation body. Part 
of a range of cross-sectoral reforms to consumer representation as first 
outlined by the Consumer Protection Green Paper in 1998, the role of the 
Consumer Panel is to advise Ofcom and other bodies about the interests of 
consumers and small businesses in relation to electronic communications 
markets (but not including content).   
 
The remit of the Panel was defined by the Act in a broad way, including for 
example monitoring and providing information about end user equipment, 
complaints handling, service quality and dispute resolution, and the Panel had 
considerable freedom to define how best to interpret these roles and how to 
spend its budget. Spending declined from £936,000 in 2006 to £743,000 in 
2011. Because the Panel works within Ofcom (members selected by Ofcom 
with Ministerial approval) and has privileged access to Ofcom internal 
documents, the body has been able to operate effectively as a consumer 
advocate early in the policymaking process, drawing on Ofcom and operator 
complaints data, Ofcom research, as well as commissioned research. CCP 
spending on research was around £260,000 in 2006 but it declined rapidly 
due to cuts after 2008. 
 
However the issue of operational independence from Ofcom was problematic, 
with some stakeholder confusion about the role of the Panel. In 2008, after 
the first Panel Chair, Collette Bowe became a member of the Ofcom Board, 
the Ofcom Consumer Panel was re-named the Communications Consumer 
Panel in order to underline the independence of the body, and a mainly new 
board and chair (Anna Bradley) were installed.  
 
 
2. Consumer Failure3 in Telecommunications and Media 
 
The Consumer Panel has had an important role to play in a fast changing 
sector. Bill Monitor (a price comparison site) recently calculated that the total 
number of potential mobile telephony deals in the UK in September 2010 was 
over seven million. Whilst this number may be exaggerated as some of these 
tariffs may no longer be available, the point of principle remains: with the level 
of choice and complexity in telecommunications markets, consumers’ 
rationality may be stretched. The same research suggests that the vast 
majority of UK mobile telephony consumers are on the ‘wrong’ tariff,4 and 
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there is ongoing evidence that consumers, and particular groups of 
consumers, may not always make the right choices.  
 
2.1 Barriers to switching  
 
Many things may explain the apparent discrepancy between the switching 
behaviour of communications consumers (illustrated in Figure 1 below from 
Ofcom’s Consumer Experience Report 2010) and those of other utilities. The 
fact that consumers are significantly more likely to switch providers of energy 
and insurance may reflect the different levels of price, choice and competition 
in those markets.  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Customers who have switched communications and 
utilities suppliers 
 
 
We do not have comparative data which would confirm whether 
communications markets constitute a special case, but research on the 
communications sector indicates that the hassle factor, together with a range 
of sector specific factors does hinder switching. According to the Consumer 
Experience report on communications markets for 2010;  
 
“The main reason given for not switching, among consumers of mobile 
and bundled services, is the perceived lack of difference in cost, while 
the most common reason in the fixed-line and broadband markets is 
the hassle involved in switching (twenty-five per cent of fixed-line and 
27% of broadband consumers said they were ‘too busy/ do not have 
time to research the options’). For multichannel TV, the most common 
reason for not switching was a combination of hassle (30%) and ‘no 
perceived cost advantage’ (29%“.5 
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8 
 
LSE Media Policy Project: Media policy brief 4 
Consumer Representation in UK Communications  
It is likely that technical literacy and the related problem of speed of 
innovation may raise particular barriers to switching in the communications 
sector.  
 
2.2 Consumer literacy and information  
 
Problems of consumer literacy are highlighted when we examine Ofcom’s 
Consumer Experience data on trends in consumer perceptions of various 
services since 2008. In the case of mobile services and bundled services, 
there has been significant stalling and reversal in consumers’ views on ease 
of switching provider particularly if those decision-makers who report they 
don’t know how easy or difficult it is to switch.  
 
Figure 2: Perceived consumer opinion about ease of switching supplier, 
among those who have never switched. 
 
 
This kind of survey data is notorious for underestimating consumer difficulties 
(because they ask consumers to self-report on their lack of ability) but even 
so, in relation to bundles they still register a reduction in the numbers that 
perceive switching is easy, (among non switchers) and an increase in those 
that say it is difficult over the past 3 years. Whilst the numbers involved are 
small, the direction of travel is significant. As markets mature it might be 
expected that perceptions would have improved. In this case the opposite is 
true.  
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Measures to improve transparency and information are a very important part 
of how regulators help make markets work more effectively in the consumer 
interest.6 But there is more to information and transparency than meets the 
eye. To what extent do consumers understand 
the information provided – for example on 
broadband speeds, or traffic management 
policies. And to what extent do people act on 
that information? Are there specific groups that 
act on this information whereas others do not?  
 
In addition, the economics of networked 
industries are such that they can tend to be 
dominated by a small group of players, and 
have particular tendencies to network effects 
which accentuate problems of ‘lock in’ when 
technology standards choices are made. So 
whilst consumers may value a particular new 
platform – Freeview for example – their taking 
up this platform may in fact undermine the market for a technology that 
delivers superior services. The role of the regulator in ascertaining the value 
to citizens and consumers of allocating public resources such as spectrum to 
such a service is very complex and contestable.  
 
 
Simply improving information on currently available services is only 
part of the challenge. Regulators and policymakers need to consider 
how consumers will understand the information and how they will act 
upon it.   
 
 
 2.3 ‘Vulnerable Customers’? 
  
There are also other questions that should be considered. Are there particular 
groups of consumers that are unable to benefit from certain types of services, 
and who are currently peripheral to the market? Is there a role for a consumer 
champion in attempting to ensure they are more active in the market? Since 
2005, Ofcom has been tracking the level of participation of different socio-
demographic segments of the population in communication markets. 
  
 
 
Problems of 
information are 
compounded for 
communications 
services by the high 
rate of innovation, and 
because they tend to 
be ‘experience goods’ 
whose utility is only 
understood after 
consumption.   
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Figure 3: Demographic difference between participation segments in the 
mobile market 
 
 
The Ofcom Consumer Experience report for 2010 in which the figure above 
appeared shows that 66% of over 65s are passive or inactive in the mobile 
market. This compares with only 26% of 16-24 year olds who are inactive or 
passive in the mobile market. It is highly likely that this results in detriment not 
only for inactive consumers, who are even more likely to be on the wrong 
tariff, but for all older consumers, because the market does not benefit and is 
not strategically responding to this potential area of growth.  
 
 
This is not a question of special treatment or special pleading for 
particular groups. It is a question of ensuring that markets work well, 
and for the benefit of all. 
 
 
3. What Drives Consumer Choice? 
 
The question of what drives consumer switching, how it can be encouraged, 
and the extent to which it is ‘rational’ are therefore key questions of broader 
political and policy import. Such questions are not the preserve of any sector, 
or a particular regulatory body, they are at the centre of a broader rethinking 
of the assumptions of regulatory policymaking, embodied in recent academic 
work in behavioural economics. One of the many insights of this field is that 
we should not take the rationality of consumers for granted: there may be 
things that we need to do to protect and promote consumer choice-making, 
including providing so called ‘nudges’.7  
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“In a competitive environment, one effective way for consumers to 
express their preferences is through the market mechanism. However, 
market mechanisms are not a panacea. Particular consumers may not 
be in possession of all the relevant information or have the incentives 
to collect this information, necessary to make decisions effectively. 
Such limitations may apply particularly to some consumer groups.”8 
 
However dedicated to ‘evidence-based policymaking’ a regulator is, 
consumers usually appear in evidence as a theoretical construct, or a set of 
assumptions.  
 
The theoretical consumer is: 
• Perfectly rational 
• Well informed 
• Has time and motivation to study options and switch9 
 
In this sense the theoretical consumer is at the very centre of the competitive 
vision for communication. In many, perhaps most areas, the construct does 
apply.10 We sometimes find that real consumers, particularly in fast changing 
technical areas like communications, do not resemble these theoretical 
consumers. Rather they have an alarming tendency to be: 
 
• Irrational (or at least subject to systematic forms of bias) 
• Lacking in access to information (or, increasingly the time or ability to 
search for the most useful information in the mire of other information). 
• Far too busy/lazy/bored/rich/poor to spend time studying their options 
and switch service providers. 
• And in particular they are often challenged by fast-changing markets.  
 
Unfortunately for regulators, it is difficult to predict when consumers in relation 
to any particular market, or aspect of consumer satisfaction resemble the 
latter or the former category. Usually consumers as a whole are divided into 
different overlapping groups, and the extent to which they are active and 
effective varies between product markets.11  
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4. Tools and Remedies for a Communications Consumer 
Champion 
 
Identifying information gaps 
 
A consumer champion should be involved in monitoring and researching 
the information needs of real consumers. The MyData initiative by the 
Department of Business Innovation and Skills is one example of an attempt 
to do this.12  But the difficulties consumers face are often unpredictable. An 
example might be the information provided about broadband speed or 
mobile coverage. Not only are such service quality data very sensitive to 
topography and geography (even down to differences between buildings 
and within buildings) but different consumers will have radically different 
preferences for how they should receive data on service quality.  
 
Information depends not only on the supply side but also on the demand 
side – the consumers that are to be informed. Understanding the 
information uses and needs of consumers is an essential part of making 
markets work. And providing information to consumers is an immensely 
complex task. Not only is the information likely to be complex and 
contested (witness the problem of providing information on mobile service 
coverage) but preferences regarding how the information should best be 
presented vary among consumers.13 
 
Identifying consumer market failure 
 
Conventional market failure analysis focus on the supply side, but some 
key sources of market failure – such as merit goods, externalities and 
information problems can be alleviated by consumer literacy and 
empowerment. The consumer champion should identify and - through 
targeted interventions and ‘nudges’14 – rectify such market failures. 
 
 Identifying vulnerable groups 
 
One key problem with consumer protection in pro-competition, pro-market 
regulatory regimes is that many of the measures of market failure tend to 
assume one type of consumer: highly competent, informed and active.  
 
However there may be systematic differences – to do with dexterity, 
literacy, ability or preferences that mean that certain consumers and 
citizens are not adequately reflected in the assumptions.  
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Identifying citizen and social value: the real citizens’ perspective  
 
It is widely acknowledged that externalities and citizen or social value may 
lead to market failure: the market may not deliver maximum overall social 
welfare if some benefits or dis-benefits of the good or service affect third 
parties rather than producers and consumers. Communications 
policymaking is often involved in the attempt to isolate those broader social 
values.15 
 
 Longer-term regulatory strategy and horizon scanning 
 
A consumer champion with sector specific expertise should be able to 
identify potential future problems based on experience and research. This 
is more difficult to do simply through analysis of complaints data. By 
carrying out research on consumers it is possible also to explore how 
consumers’ needs and the role of communications services in meeting 
those needs are likely to change. This can include: 
 
• Identifying specific product and service markets where key market 
mechanisms are not working; because of a lack of information, 
skills, or coordination problems. 
• Identifying potential regulatory failures: for example in ensuring that 
spectrum allocation policies reflect both consumer demand and 
social value. 
• Identifying those areas where traditional tools, such as ensuring all 
market segments are adequately competitive and resolving 
information problems, are not enough to address consumer 
interests.  
• Encouraging decision-makers to focus on consumer outcomes 
rather than assuming that their traditional tools will work. For 
example highlighting cases where providing consumers with more 
information or choice may be unlikely to deliver benefit because of 
a lack of consumer motivation to seek information. 
 
Regulation as a balance of competition, intervention, regulation by 
the market and self regulation 
 
Consumer representation in regulatory policymaking has an important role 
to play, and if it is not adequately supported in the new regulatory 
framework then it is not only the case that certain groups of ‘vulnerable 
consumers’ such as older people will suffer as a result. The efficient 
operation of the market will also suffer. 
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Ofcom and other regulators are constrained by Treasury Green Book16 
approaches to intervention, and the overarching framework that suggests 
that careful market failure analyses should take place before any 
intervention is made, to determine why the market is failing to respond to 
any consumer demand, and what the costs and benefits of any proposed 
intervention might be. Policymakers should also be aware of the scope for 
regulatory failure (why should they do any better?) and carry out 
assessments of regulatory impact.  
 
Consumer information and data is very often an important part of those 
processes, particularly in highlighting the benefits of switching e.g. 
consumer research on switching supported gaining-provider led 
processes17, over losing provider led processes. As the examples in this 
paper demonstrate, it is extremely important that the consumer dimension 
is not neglected.  
 
5. Proposed Changes to Consumer Representation 
 
The Government Minister responsible for the current reforms, Ed Davy, 
acknowledges the key, permanent role for consumer representatives: 
 
 “The empowerment of consumers is not just about making markets 
competitive, however, vital though that is. Even the most 
competitive markets will not always deliver the best results for 
consumers without a properly enforced framework of regulation to 
protect the consumer interest.”  
 
Clearly, improvements can be made to the current framework.  
 
“..duplication of effort … leads to waste and inefficiency in the use 
of public funds. It draws resources from the front line, resources 
which could better be used driving forward consumer 
empowerment directly – a key commitment in the Coalition’s 
programme for Government.” 18  
 
There are therefore two key questions to ask of the proposed reforms: are 
they likely to improve outcomes and are they likely to reduce public 
spending. Analysis for this paper suggests that for the communications 
sector they will do neither. 
 
The Government proposes that the Citizens Advice Bureau should become 
the sole official consumer advocate body, given responsibilities of general 
and sector specific advocacy.  Under the proposal, Consumer Focus and 
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all existing sectoral advocacy groups would be dismantled and ostensibly 
recreated within Citizens Advice. BIS would prefer that as many sectoral 
advocacy groups as possible make the move to Citizens Advice, but 
acknowledges that the final decision rests with the particular Departments. 
 
BIS briefly mentions the possibility of simply leaving things as they are, 
though the effect of the “current economic climate” on budgets is presented 
as such that the status quo is “not a realistic option.”  While arguing that 
the status quo is not an option due to budgetary constraints, the BIS 
seems to be touting as advantages to their proposal an expansion of 
customer services. 
 
5.1 Cross-sectoral expertise 
 
Twin goals of the proposed one stop shop are to increase the influence of 
sectoral advocacy and cut costs by reducing redundant research and 
organizational roles. 
 
In regard to the influence of sectoral advocacy, the BIS proposal neglects 
the value of access. An advantage to having the Communications 
Consumer Panel structurally located within Ofcom is the proximity to the 
regulator which offers privileged access to Ofcom policy processes and 
targeted efficient interventions. The proposed changes would eliminate that 
advantage and create potential obstacles between regulators and 
consumer advocates. 
 
In order to do its work well, the consumer advocate body will have to go 
through more time consuming and bureaucratic processes in order to 
access Ofcom internal data and research. Whilst the consumer advocacy 
group will still have access to Ofcom data, it will not share staff and 
resources with the consumer panel, and will not have access to Ofcom 
staff and internal policies until after they are published. 
 
The Citizens Advice Bureau model does offer the advantage of having 
frontline staff deal directly with consumers, which could improve services to 
consumers. It will however be of concern whether frontline staff will be able 
to cope with the specialist knowledge and training in order to be an 
effective advocate for the new range of sectors, including communications. 
 
It is, therefore, not clear exactly how the proposed changes would cut 
costs.  BIS suggests that an enlarged Citizens Advice Bureau would allow 
for a “local presence for sectoral advocacy” and “face-to-face advice 
services on sectoral issues.”19  While these sound like potentially good 
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things, they would require customer-facing personnel familiar with sectoral 
issues.  How exactly these services would be funded is unclear. 
 
5.2 Increasing burden on the public purse 
 
Comparing the funding models between Ofcom and Citizens Advice, it is 
apparent that under the proposals being advanced by the government, 
public funding would play a substantially larger role for the consumer 
advocate. Currently funding for the Communications Consumer Panel 
comes from Ofcom budgets. Under the proposals, this funding burden 
would be placed on the Citizens Advice Bureau. 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of funding sources for Ofcom and Citizens Advice 
 
Source: Annual Reports 
 
Taking the average budget for the Consumer Panel from 2006 to 2011 as 
a reference point, this comes to an average total cost of £819,400.  With 
the 2009-10 revenue models as a guideline, this would translate into an 
increase in the average total cost to the public purse of £196,656.  
However, if, as appears to be likely given the previous assumptions, costs 
rise, this could result in a more marked rise in the cost to the public of 
providing cross-sectoral consumer advocacy. This cost profile is not shared 
with the other sectors that are the subject of this reform. 
 
Given the broader range of issues that Citizens Advice is called upon to 
deal with, it may be that the role of protecting consumers in the 
communications sector will be less of a priority. This is likely to result in a 
significant detriment to consumers, who have in the past benefited from 
Communications Consumer Panel work for example on broadband speeds 
and mobile coverage. 
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Conclusion 
 
Consumer representation has been subject to successive waves of cross 
sectoral reform in the UK. Over a decade ago the Department for Trade 
and Industry set out a framework for consumer representation in the 
network utilities in its green paper: A Fair Deal for Consumers: Modernising 
the Framework for Utility Regulation (DTI, 1998). This set out duties to 
promote the interests of consumers ‘wherever appropriate through the 
promotion of competition’ which were implemented across the utilities and 
in the Communications Act of 2003. The Green Paper made explicit that as 
markets became more competitive, it may be appropriate to ‘sunset’ or 
phase out the clauses supporting consumer representation bodies.  
 
The 2011 Government Consultation: Empowering and Protecting 
Consumers falls short of advocating the sunsetting of consumer advocacy 
in communications. The paper underlines the need for supporting 
consumers as an aspect of a robust competition policy. However, it also 
proposes to remove most of the sector-specific consumer representation 
(for example the Communications Consumer Panel) and replace it with a 
cross-sectoral structure. Whilst this may possibly in the long term reduce 
overall costs, the Government’s approach would also: 
 
• Increase the proportion of cost met by the public, and possibly also 
the overall cost to the public. 
• Weaken consumer representation by undermining sector specific 
expertise 
• Make consumer representation more remote from the fast 
changing, technical issues that are peculiar to the communications 
sector 
• Undermine the learning and intelligence gathering on the specific 
problems faced by consumers in communications markets 
 
In the case of communications, there is an enduring and probably 
permanent need for a sector specific Consumer Protection and 
Empowerment Unit, for the following reasons: 
 
• The rapid pace of innovation and change create acute problems of 
information for consumers. 
• Evidence showing that consumers in general and particular groups 
of consumers are particularly reluctant to switch in the case of 
communications services. 
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• Behavioural biases among consumers which endure, but also 
change and develop as technology changes and should be 
monitored by specialist research. 
• Transparency measures require assessment of consumer demand 
for information. 
• There is a need for sector specific technical expertise in the 
communications sector. 
 
This body should work closely with the Citizens Advice Bureau, Ofcom and 
other consumer groups who should provide the Consumer Unit with regular 
updates on complaints, consumer empowerment and consumer welfare 
issues. Ofcom should work with the Communications Consumer Unit to 
monitor and evaluate new and existing markets. 
 
Senior officials from Ofcom, providers and the relevant government 
departments should have an obligation to answer the Communications 
Consumer Unit’s reasonable questions. The Unit should work both within 
Ofcom (and have access to internal data and information) and have an 
independent voice and brand. 
 
The key governance challenge for such a body is to give it sufficient 
independence from Ofcom, Parliament and Government (DCMS and BIS 
as the lead Departments) with adequate access to information, data and 
personnel. 
 
 Regulatory attention of late has focused on how consumer 
behavioural biases should be incorporated in regulatory decision-
making.   But to replace the simplification of a rational actor model 
of the consumer with a construct of a ‘predictably irrational’ one 
misses the point: consumers learn and adapt, and as new 
innovations occur they also need to unlearn. 
 
 In such reflexive processes the point is not to develop a more 
perfect theory of the consumer, it is to accept that there is a 
permanent need for an expert, informed consumer representative 
body able to monitor developments, make limited predictions of 
the likely impact of future policy developments and advocate on 
consumers’ behalf for targeted forms of intervention. 
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/consumer-
experience-reports/ For a discussion see Lunt and Livingstone, 2011. 
2
 The Department for Business Innovation and Skills issued a consultation in June 2011 
proposing options for reform. See Department for Business Innovation and Skills: Empowering 
and Protecting Consumers. June 2011. 
3
 OFT (2010) identified consumer failure as the ‘fourth market failure’. 
4 Bill Monitor (2010) About the Maths: “88% of people in the UK are on the wrong mobile 
phone contract, paying too much money and getting too little value”.  
5
 The Consumer Experience. Ofcom 2010. 
6 See Howard Beales, Richard Craswel and Steven Salop. Information Remedies for Consumer 
Protection. The American Economic Review 71 (2) May 1981. 
7
 Office of Fair Trading. What does Behavioural Economics Mean for Competition Policy OFT 
1224 (March 2010). http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/oft1224.pdf (last 
accessed July 5th 2011). 
8 Harker, Michael, Mathieu, Laurence; and Waddams Price, Catherine (2005) Regulation and 
consumer representation. in D. Parker (ed), International Handbook on Economic Regulation, 
Edward Elgar, Chapter 10, 2006. 
9 The OFT (2010) contrast Homo Economicus with Homo Sapiens to illustrate the limits of 
these assumptions of rationality and perfect information. 
10 See OFT (2010). P5. 
11 See the qualitative research reported in Switched On: An Elaboration of Britain’s Tech 
Savvy Consumers. Consumer Panel 2008. 
12
 See Department for Business Innovation and Skills. Better Choices, Better Deals. 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/news/topstories/2011/Apr/better-choices-better-deals 
 
13 See Communications Consumer Panel. ‘Can I Cancel? Mobile Coverage and Contract 
Cancellation.’ Consumer Research Report July 2010. 
14 Thaler, Richard, H and Sunstein, Cass. 2009. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, 
wealth and happiness. Penguin.  
15 See A Framework to Evaluate the Value of Next Generation Broadband. A Report by Plum 
Consulting for the Communications Consumer Panel.  
http://www.communicationsconsumerpanel.org.uk/smartweb/digital-inclusion/nga-s-
economic-and-social-value 
 
16 HM Treasury. The Green Book. Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. Treasury 
Guidance. 
17 Ofcom Strategic Review of Consumer Switching September 2008. 
18
 BIS. Empowering and Protecting Consumers 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/e/11-970-empowering-protecting-
consumers-consultation-on-institutional-changes.pdf 
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 BIS. Empowering and Protecting Consumers 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/consumer-issues/docs/e/11-970-empowering-protecting-
consumers-consultation-on-institutional-changes.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
LSE Media Policy Project: Media policy brief 4 
Consumer Representation in UK Communications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LSE media policy project 
 
 
About The LSE Media Policy Project aims to establish a 
deliberative relationship between policy makers, civil 
society actors, media professionals and relevant media 
research.  We want policy makers to have timely access to 
the best policy-relevant research and better access to the 
views of civil society. We also hope to engage the policy 
community with research on the policy making process 
itself.   
 
 
Links  Project blog: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/ 
Twitter: http://twitter.com/#!/LSEmediapolicy 
Facebook: http://on.fb.me/dLN3Ov 
 
 
Contact  Media.policyproject@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
